Tool (instrument)

A tool or an instrument is the means whereby some act is accomplished. A hammer, for example, is a tool used for nailing something. Tools may be physical (as a hammer) or mental (as, for example, a concept, a prescript, a model or a mathematical rule).

 

Documents, texts, libraries, knowledge organization, Information Science etc. may be considered tools which are aimed at fulfilling certain tasks in societies.

 

In the same way may science and research be considered pragmatically as part of the social division of labor in society. Technology (engineering) is a field devoted to the practical application of science, and thus to an instrumental or tool-oriented attitude in specific fields. The most general study of tools is the pragmatic philosophy and Activity Theory. John Dewey (1938), for example, regarded language as "the tool of tools".

 

"When one adopts this position, several implications come along with it. First, artifacts are recognized as transforming mental functioning in fundamental ways. In Vygotsky's view:

The inclusion of a tool in the process of behavior (a) introduces several new functions connected with the use of the given tool and with its control; (b) abolishes and makes unnecessary several natural processes, whose work is accomplished by the tool; and alters the course and individual features (the intensity, duration, sequence, etc.) of all the mental processes that enter into the composition of the instrumental act, replacing some functions with others (i.e., it re-creates and reorganizes the whole structure of behavior just as a technical tool re-creates the whole structure of labor operations) (1981, pp.139-140).

In such a view artifacts clearly do not serve simply to facilitate mental processes that would otherwise exist. Instead, they fundamentally shape and transform them.

    A second implication of this general position is that all psychological functions begin, and to a large extent remain, culturally, historically, and institutionally situated and context specific. This follows from the fact that the artifacts which enter into human psychological functions are themselves culturally, historically, and institutionally situated. In a sense, then, there is no way not to be socioculturally situated when carrying out an action. Conversely there is no tool that is adequate to all tasks, and there is no universally appropriate form of cultural mediation. Even language, the 'tool of tools' is no exception to this rule. There are times, our grandparents told us, when silence is golden and there are times we all know when words fail us.

    A third implication of making cultural mediation central to mind and mental development is that the meaning of an action and of a context are not specifiable independent of each other. Taking 'action in context' as the unit of psychological analysis requires a relational interpretation of mind; objects and contexts arise together as part of a single bio-social-cultural process of development.

    Fourth is the implication that mind is no longer to be located entirely inside the head; higher psychological functions are transactions that include the biological individual, the cultural mediational artifacts, and the culturally structured social and natural environments of which persons are a part.1 " (Cole & Wertsch [2001]).

 

Concepts, theories, models etc. may be termed cognitive toolsSemantic tools, such as dictionaries, classification systems, thesauri, etc., is a subset of cognitive tools.

 

 

An elaborated model of the role of tools in human activities has been developed by Y. Engeström:

 

 

Figure 1

 

Processes within an activity
(adapted from Cole & Engeström, 1993)

 

 

Literature:

Cole, M. & Engeström, Y. (1993). A cultural-historical approach to distributed cognition. In G. Salomon (Ed), Distributed Cognitions: Psychological and Educational Considerations (pp. 1-46). New York: Cambridge University Press.  

Cole, M. & Wertsch, J. W. [2001]. Beyond the Individual-Social Antimony in Discussions of Piaget and Vygotsky. http://www.massey.ac.nz/~alock/virtual/colevyg.htm

 

Dam Christensen, H. &  Larsen, L. C. (Eds.). (2004). Det kunsthistoriske studieapparat. Hånd- og debatbog fra den videnskabelige hverdag. Copenhagen: Multivers Academic.
 

Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and education. New York: Macmillan.

 

Price, D. J. de Solla (1982). Scientists and their tools. IN: Frontiers of science; on the brink of tomorrow. Prepared by the Special Publications Division, National Geographic Society; National Geographic Society (U.S.). Special Publications Division. [Washington, D.C.] : The Society.

 

 

See also: Activity theory (epistemological lifeboat); Semantic tools

 

 

 

 

Birger Hjørland

Last edited: 27-03-2007

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